http://www.historynet.com/battle-of-khe-sanh-recounting-the-battlescasualties.htm
By Peter Brush
The 1968 Battle of Khe Sanh was the longest, deadliest and most
controversial of the Vietnam War, pitting the U.S. Marines and their
allies against the North Vietnamese Army. Both sides have published
official histories of the battle, and while these histories agree the
fighting took place at Khe Sanh, they disagree on virtually every other
aspect of it.
In an unconventional war without conventional front lines, statistics became the most critical measure of progress. The most controversial statistic in Vietnam was the number of killed in action (KIA) claimed by each side. If a battle tallied a sufficiently favorable body count ratio, American commanders declared victory, as they did after Khe Sanh. A closer look at the Khe Sanh body count, however, reveals anything but a straightforward matter of numbers.
Khe Sanh is a village located near the Laotian border and just south
of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that separated North and South
Vietnam. As early as 1962, the U.S. Military Command–Vietnam (MACV)
established an Army Special Forces camp near the village. The Americans
wanted a military presence there to block the infiltration of enemy
forces from Laos, to provide a base for launching patrols into Laos to
monitor the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and to serve as a western anchor for
defense along the DMZ.
In 1966 the Marines built a base adjacent to the Army position, and organized their combat activities around named operations. By early 1967, the Marine position was reinforced to regimental strength. On April 20, Operation Prairie IV began, with heavy fighting between the Marines and NVA forces. The next operations were named Crockett and Ardmore.
Beginning in October 1967, the Communists greatly increased their forces in the Khe Sanh area to total two infantry divisions, two artillery regiments and an armored regiment. These forces, including support troops, totaled 20,000 to 30,000. The Marine garrison was also reinforced, and on November 1, 1967, Operation Scotland began. The Marine Corps casualty reporting system was based on named operations and not geographic location. Consequently, and unknown at the time, Operation Scotland became the starting point of the Battle of Khe Sanh in terms of Marine casualty reporting.
By the middle of January 1968, some 6,000 Marines and Army troops occupied the Khe Sanh Combat Base and its surrounding positions. Khe Sanh was situated on Route 9, the major east-west highway. Because of washed-out bridges and heavy enemy activity, however, the only way for Americans to get to Khe Sanh was by helicopter or airplane.
During the darkness of January 20-21, the NVA launched a series of coordinated attacks against American positions. At 0330 hours, soldiers of the NVA 6th Battalion, 2nd Regiment, 325C Division, attacked the Marines on Hill 861. Among the dead Marines was 18-year-old Pfc Curtis Bugger. About two hours later, an NVA artillery barrage scored a hit on the main ammunition dump at Khe Sanh Combat Base, killing Lance Corp. Jerry Stenberg and other Marines. At about 0640 hours the NVA 7th Battalion, 66th Regiment, 304th Division, attacked the Huong Hoa District headquarters in Khe Sanh village. This fighting was heavy, involving South Vietnamese militia as well as U.S. Army MACV advisers and Marines attached to a Combined Action Company platoon. That afternoon, as a rescue force was dispatched to the village, Army Lt. Col. Joseph Seymoe and other soldiers died when their helicopter was attacked.
The monumental Battle of Khe Sanh had begun, but the January 21 starting date is essentially arbitrary in terms of casualty reporting. Five Marines were killed on January 19 and 20, while on reconnaissance patrols. The Marine defense of Khe Sanh, Operation Scotland, officially ended on March 31.
On April 6, a front-page story in The New York Times declared that the siege of Khe Sanh had been lifted. According to the official Marine Corps history of the battle, total fatalities for Operation Scotland were "205 friendly KIA." The Marines recorded an actual body count of 1,602 NVA killed but estimated the total NVA dead at between 10,000 and 15,000. Time magazine, in an April 12, 1968, article titled "Victory at Khe Sanh," reported General William Westmoreland, commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, after flying into Khe Sanh by helicopter, declaring: "We took 220 killed at Khe Sanh and about 800 wounded and evacuated. The enemy by my count suffered at least 15,000 dead in the area."
As journalist Robert Pisor pointed out in his 1982 book, The End of the Line: The Siege of Khe Sanh, no other battle of the entire war produced a better body count or kill ratio than that claimed by the Americans at Khe Sanh. Westmoreland echoed this judgment in his memoirs, and, using exactly the same figures, concluded that the North Vietnamese had suffered a most damaging and one-sided defeat. Senior Marine Corps General Victor Krulak agreed, noting on May 13 that the Marines had defeated the North Vietnamese and "won the battle of Khe Sanh." Over time, these KIA figures have been accepted by historians. They produced a body count ratio in the range between 50:1 and 75:1. By comparison, according to another Army general, a 10:1 ratio was considered average and 25:1 was considered very good.
But Pisor also pointed out that "205 is a completely false number." One had to meet certain criteria before being officially considered KIA at Khe Sanh. It was not sufficient to simply be an American military person killed in the fighting there during the winter and spring of 1967-68.
Only those killed in action during Operation Scotland, which began on November 1, 1967, and ended on March 31, 1968, were included in the official casualty count. On January 14, Marines from Company B, 3rd Recon Battalion, were moving up the north slope of Hill 881 North, a few miles northwest of Khe Sanh Combat Base. When an enemy rocket-propelled grenade killed 2nd Lt. Randall Yearly and Corporal Richard John, although these Marines died before the beginning of the siege, their deaths were included in the official statistics. The NVA used Hill 881 North to launch 122mm rockets at the Marines during the siege. On Easter Sunday, April 14, the 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines (3/26), assaulted Hill 881 North in order to clear the enemy firing positions. Lima Company finally seized the hill after overcoming determined NVA resistance. Unlike the Marines killed in the same place in January, since Operation Scotland had ended, the four Lima Company Marines who died in this attack on Hill 881 North were excluded from the official statistics.
Seven miles west of Khe Sanh on Route 9, and about halfway to the Laotian border, sat the U.S. Army Special Forces camp at Lang Vei. Khe Sanh had long been responsible for the defense of Lang Vei. Shortly after midnight on February 7, a large NVA force, reinforced with tanks, attacked the camp. Its mission was to destroy the Special Forces and their Vietnamese allies and to ambush any reinforcements coming from Khe Sanh. The Marines, fearing an ambush, did not attempt a relief, and after heavy fighting the camp was overrun. Ten American soldiers were killed; the rest managed to escape down Route 9 to Khe Sanh. Those 10 deaths were also left out of the official statistics.
The American military presence at Khe Sanh consisted not only of the Marine Corps Khe Sanh Combat Base, but also Forward Operating Base 3, U.S. Army (FOB-3). Many American casualties were caused by the 10,908 rounds of rockets, artillery and mortars the North Vietnamese fired into the base and hill positions. Army deaths at FOB-3, however, were not included in the official statistics either.
The Operation Scotland tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) was limited to the area around Khe Sanh along Route 9 in western Quang Tri province. On March 6, two U.S. Air Force C-123 cargo airplanes departed Da Nang Air Base en route to Khe Sanh. At 1530 hours the first C-123, with 44 passengers and a crew of five, began to land. Enemy artillery rounds slammed into the runway. The tower at Khe Sanh instructed the pilot to take evasive action and go around for another approach. While climbing, the C-123 was struck by several bursts of heavy machine gun and recoilless rifle fire. The plane, piloted by Lt. Col. Frederick J. Hampton, crashed in a huge fireball a few miles east of Khe Sanh, killing all aboard. Since the Marines on board were not yet officially attached to the 26th Marine Regiment, their deaths were not included in the official Khe Sanh count, nor were the several other deaths associated with aircraft crashes. Had the plane been shot down departing Khe Sanh, the casualties would have been counted.
Besieged, Khe Sanh could only be resupplied by air. MACV therefore initiated an operation to open Route 9 to vehicle traffic. Operation Pegasus, begun the day after Scotland ended, lasted until April 15. The Pegasus force consisted of the Army 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) plus the 1st Marine Regiment. Setting out from Ca Lu, 10 miles east of Khe Sanh, Pegasus opened the highway, linked up with the Marines at Khe Sanh, and engaged NVA in the surrounding area. Operation Pegasus casualties included 59 U.S. Army and 51 Marine Corps dead. They too were left out of the official Khe Sanh casualty count.
On April 15, Operation Pegasus ended and Operation Scotland II began. The Marines at Khe Sanh Combat Base broke out of their perimeter and began attacking the North Vietnamese in the surrounding area. The Army's 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), with more than 400 helicopters under its control, conducted airmobile operations deeper into enemy-controlled areas. The fighting was heavy. An additional 413 Marines were killed during Scotland II as of the end of June 1968. Operation Scotland II continued until the end of the year, resulting in the deaths of 72 more Marines. None of the deaths associated with Scotland II are included in the official count. Historian Ronald Spector, in the book After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam, noted that American casualties in the 10 weeks after the start of Operation Pegasus were more than twice those officially reported during the siege.
The deaths of U.S. Air Force personnel, estimated between five and 20, are also omitted. The official figure of 205 KIA only represents Marine deaths in the Operation Scotland TAOR—that is, Marines killed in proximity to the Khe Sanh Combat Base during the period from November 1, 1967, to March 31, 1968. Scotland was a 26th Marine Regiment operation, so only the deaths of Marines assigned to the regiment, and attached supporting units, were counted. This time period does not particularly coincide with the fighting; rather, it dates from before the siege began and terminates before the siege (and the fighting) ended. The distinctions between Operations Scotland, Pegasus and Scotland II, while important from the command perspective, were not necessarily apparent to individual Marines. For them, the battle started when the North Vietnamese attacks began in January. Fighting around Khe Sanh was continuous. For example, I served with a Marine heavy mortar battery at Khe Sanh during the siege. But only by checking my service record while writing this article did it become evident that I had participated in all three operations.
Upon closer analysis, the official figure does not accurately portray even what it purports to represent. According to Ray Stubbe, a U.S. Navy chaplain during the siege and since then the most significant Khe Sanh historian, the 205 figure is taken only from the records of the 26th Marine Regiment. Stubbe examined the command chronologies of the 1st and 2nd battalions, 26th Marines, plus the after-action reports of the 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines; 1st Battalion, 9th Marines; 1st Battalion, 13th Marines; and more than one dozen other units, all present at Khe Sanh under 26th Marine operational control. These combined sources report a total of 354 KIA. Unlike the official figures, Stubbe's database of Khe Sanh casualties includes verifiable names and dates of death.
On June 19, 1968, another operation began at Khe Sanh, Operation Charlie, the final evacuation and destruction of the Khe Sanh Combat Base. The Marines withdrew all salvageable material and destroyed everything else. The NVA continued shelling the base, and on July 1 launched a company-sized infantry attack against its perimeter. Two Marines died. NVA casualties were more than 200. The base was officially closed on July 5. Marines stayed in the area, conducting operations to recover the bodies of Marines killed previously. On July 10, Pfc Robert Hernandez of Company A, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, was manning an M-60 machine gun position when it took a direct hit from NVA mortars. Hernandez was killed. Ten more Marines and 89 NVA died during this period. They were not included in the official Khe Sanh counts.
On July 11, the Marines finally left Khe Sanh. This is the battle's end date from the North Vietnamese perspective. The NVA 304th Division's history notes that on "9 July 1968, the liberation flag was waving from the flag pole at Ta Con [Khe Sanh] airfield." On July 13, 1968, Ho Chi Minh sent a message to the soldiers of the Route 9–Khe Sanh Front affirming "our victory at Khe Sanh."
The Khe Sanh battlefield was considerably more extensive from the North Vietnamese perspective than from that of the U.S. Marine Corps, both geographically and chronologically. The NVA's main command post was located in Laos, at Sar Lit. Battlefield boundaries extended from eastern Laos eastward along both sides of Route 9 in Quang Tri province, Vietnam, to the coast. Taking a larger but more realistic view, the Khe Sanh campaign resulted in a death toll of American military personnel that approached 1,000.
The official, public estimate of 10,000 to 15,000 North Vietnamese KIA stands in contrast to another estimate made by the American military. On April 5, 1968, MACV prepared an "Analysis of the Khe Sanh Battle" for General Westmoreland. The report, originally classified as secret, noted that intelligence from many sources indicated conclusively that the North Vietnamese had planned a massive ground attack against the base. The attack was to have been supported by armor and artillery. Due to severe losses, however, the NVA abandoned its plan for a massive ground attack. The losses—indicating that the enemy suffered a major defeat—were estimated at 3,550 KIA inflicted by delivered fires (i.e., aerial and artillery bombardment) and 2,000 KIA from ground action, for a total of 5,550 estimated North Vietnamese killed in action as of March 31.
Ray Stubbe has published a translation of the North Vietnamese history of the siege at Khe Sanh. According to this history, originally classified as secret, the battle deaths for all major NVA units participating in the entire Highway 9–
Khe Sanh Front from January 20 until July 20, 1968, totaled 2,469.
Ho Chi Minh's oft-quoted admonition to the French applied equally to the Americans: "You can kill ten of my men for every one I kill of yours, but even at those odds, you will lose and I will win." The calculation by Stubbe that approximately 1,000 Americans died on the Khe Sanh battlefield is especially compelling, given that Stubbe's numbers are accompanied by names and dates of death. Since the official duration of the battle ends even earlier than the termination of the siege itself, a wider definition of the Khe Sanh battlefield to include Operations Scotland, Pegasus and Scotland II also seems reasonable. The official statistics yield a KIA ratio of between 50:1 and 75:1 of North Vietnamese to U.S. military deaths. The figures of 5,500 NVA dead and 1,000 U.S. dead yield a ratio of 5.5:1.
It is difficult to support the claim of an overwhelming American victory at Khe Sanh based solely on the ratios derived from the official casualty count. In fact, neither side won a resounding victory. The NVA surrounded Khe Sanh in an attempt to force the Marines to break out of their fighting positions, which would make it easier to engage and destroy them. If that failed, and it did, they hoped to attack American reinforcements along Route 9 between Khe Sanh and Laos. Operation Pegasus forces, however, were highly mobile and did not attack en masse down Route 9 far enough west of Khe Sanh for the NVA, by then dispersed, to implement their plan.
The Marines knew that their withdrawal from Khe Sanh would present a propaganda victory for Hanoi. On June 28, a Communist spokesman claimed the Americans had been forced to retreat and that Khe Sanh was the "gravest tactical and strategic defeat" for the U.S. in the war. It was the only time Americans abandoned a major combat base because of enemy pressure.
Strategically, however, the withdrawal meant little. The new anchor base was established at Ca Lu, a few miles down Route 9 to the east. Mobile combat operations continued against the North Vietnamese. U.S. reconnaissance forces continued to monitor the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The Marines and their allies at Khe Sanh engaged tens of thousands, and killed thousands, of NVA over a period of many weeks. Indeed, had enemy forces not been at Khe Sanh, they could have joined the NVA and VC who occupied Hue, a much more important strategic target. The Marines fought long, hard and well at Khe Sanh, but they sacrificed in much greater numbers than has been acknowledged by official sources.
Marine Khe Sanh veteran Peter Brush is Vietnam Magazine's book review editor. For additional reading, see: Valley of Decision: The Siege of Khe Sanh, by John Prados and Ray W. Stubbe; and the official Marine Corps history, The Battle for Khe Sanh, by Moyers S. Shore II.
This article was written by Peter Brush and originally published in the June 2007 issue of Vietnam Magazine. For more great articles, subscribe to Vietnam magazine today!
In an unconventional war without conventional front lines, statistics became the most critical measure of progress. The most controversial statistic in Vietnam was the number of killed in action (KIA) claimed by each side. If a battle tallied a sufficiently favorable body count ratio, American commanders declared victory, as they did after Khe Sanh. A closer look at the Khe Sanh body count, however, reveals anything but a straightforward matter of numbers.
In 1966 the Marines built a base adjacent to the Army position, and organized their combat activities around named operations. By early 1967, the Marine position was reinforced to regimental strength. On April 20, Operation Prairie IV began, with heavy fighting between the Marines and NVA forces. The next operations were named Crockett and Ardmore.
Beginning in October 1967, the Communists greatly increased their forces in the Khe Sanh area to total two infantry divisions, two artillery regiments and an armored regiment. These forces, including support troops, totaled 20,000 to 30,000. The Marine garrison was also reinforced, and on November 1, 1967, Operation Scotland began. The Marine Corps casualty reporting system was based on named operations and not geographic location. Consequently, and unknown at the time, Operation Scotland became the starting point of the Battle of Khe Sanh in terms of Marine casualty reporting.
By the middle of January 1968, some 6,000 Marines and Army troops occupied the Khe Sanh Combat Base and its surrounding positions. Khe Sanh was situated on Route 9, the major east-west highway. Because of washed-out bridges and heavy enemy activity, however, the only way for Americans to get to Khe Sanh was by helicopter or airplane.
During the darkness of January 20-21, the NVA launched a series of coordinated attacks against American positions. At 0330 hours, soldiers of the NVA 6th Battalion, 2nd Regiment, 325C Division, attacked the Marines on Hill 861. Among the dead Marines was 18-year-old Pfc Curtis Bugger. About two hours later, an NVA artillery barrage scored a hit on the main ammunition dump at Khe Sanh Combat Base, killing Lance Corp. Jerry Stenberg and other Marines. At about 0640 hours the NVA 7th Battalion, 66th Regiment, 304th Division, attacked the Huong Hoa District headquarters in Khe Sanh village. This fighting was heavy, involving South Vietnamese militia as well as U.S. Army MACV advisers and Marines attached to a Combined Action Company platoon. That afternoon, as a rescue force was dispatched to the village, Army Lt. Col. Joseph Seymoe and other soldiers died when their helicopter was attacked.
The monumental Battle of Khe Sanh had begun, but the January 21 starting date is essentially arbitrary in terms of casualty reporting. Five Marines were killed on January 19 and 20, while on reconnaissance patrols. The Marine defense of Khe Sanh, Operation Scotland, officially ended on March 31.
On April 6, a front-page story in The New York Times declared that the siege of Khe Sanh had been lifted. According to the official Marine Corps history of the battle, total fatalities for Operation Scotland were "205 friendly KIA." The Marines recorded an actual body count of 1,602 NVA killed but estimated the total NVA dead at between 10,000 and 15,000. Time magazine, in an April 12, 1968, article titled "Victory at Khe Sanh," reported General William Westmoreland, commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, after flying into Khe Sanh by helicopter, declaring: "We took 220 killed at Khe Sanh and about 800 wounded and evacuated. The enemy by my count suffered at least 15,000 dead in the area."
As journalist Robert Pisor pointed out in his 1982 book, The End of the Line: The Siege of Khe Sanh, no other battle of the entire war produced a better body count or kill ratio than that claimed by the Americans at Khe Sanh. Westmoreland echoed this judgment in his memoirs, and, using exactly the same figures, concluded that the North Vietnamese had suffered a most damaging and one-sided defeat. Senior Marine Corps General Victor Krulak agreed, noting on May 13 that the Marines had defeated the North Vietnamese and "won the battle of Khe Sanh." Over time, these KIA figures have been accepted by historians. They produced a body count ratio in the range between 50:1 and 75:1. By comparison, according to another Army general, a 10:1 ratio was considered average and 25:1 was considered very good.
But Pisor also pointed out that "205 is a completely false number." One had to meet certain criteria before being officially considered KIA at Khe Sanh. It was not sufficient to simply be an American military person killed in the fighting there during the winter and spring of 1967-68.
Only those killed in action during Operation Scotland, which began on November 1, 1967, and ended on March 31, 1968, were included in the official casualty count. On January 14, Marines from Company B, 3rd Recon Battalion, were moving up the north slope of Hill 881 North, a few miles northwest of Khe Sanh Combat Base. When an enemy rocket-propelled grenade killed 2nd Lt. Randall Yearly and Corporal Richard John, although these Marines died before the beginning of the siege, their deaths were included in the official statistics. The NVA used Hill 881 North to launch 122mm rockets at the Marines during the siege. On Easter Sunday, April 14, the 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines (3/26), assaulted Hill 881 North in order to clear the enemy firing positions. Lima Company finally seized the hill after overcoming determined NVA resistance. Unlike the Marines killed in the same place in January, since Operation Scotland had ended, the four Lima Company Marines who died in this attack on Hill 881 North were excluded from the official statistics.
Seven miles west of Khe Sanh on Route 9, and about halfway to the Laotian border, sat the U.S. Army Special Forces camp at Lang Vei. Khe Sanh had long been responsible for the defense of Lang Vei. Shortly after midnight on February 7, a large NVA force, reinforced with tanks, attacked the camp. Its mission was to destroy the Special Forces and their Vietnamese allies and to ambush any reinforcements coming from Khe Sanh. The Marines, fearing an ambush, did not attempt a relief, and after heavy fighting the camp was overrun. Ten American soldiers were killed; the rest managed to escape down Route 9 to Khe Sanh. Those 10 deaths were also left out of the official statistics.
The American military presence at Khe Sanh consisted not only of the Marine Corps Khe Sanh Combat Base, but also Forward Operating Base 3, U.S. Army (FOB-3). Many American casualties were caused by the 10,908 rounds of rockets, artillery and mortars the North Vietnamese fired into the base and hill positions. Army deaths at FOB-3, however, were not included in the official statistics either.
The Operation Scotland tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) was limited to the area around Khe Sanh along Route 9 in western Quang Tri province. On March 6, two U.S. Air Force C-123 cargo airplanes departed Da Nang Air Base en route to Khe Sanh. At 1530 hours the first C-123, with 44 passengers and a crew of five, began to land. Enemy artillery rounds slammed into the runway. The tower at Khe Sanh instructed the pilot to take evasive action and go around for another approach. While climbing, the C-123 was struck by several bursts of heavy machine gun and recoilless rifle fire. The plane, piloted by Lt. Col. Frederick J. Hampton, crashed in a huge fireball a few miles east of Khe Sanh, killing all aboard. Since the Marines on board were not yet officially attached to the 26th Marine Regiment, their deaths were not included in the official Khe Sanh count, nor were the several other deaths associated with aircraft crashes. Had the plane been shot down departing Khe Sanh, the casualties would have been counted.
Besieged, Khe Sanh could only be resupplied by air. MACV therefore initiated an operation to open Route 9 to vehicle traffic. Operation Pegasus, begun the day after Scotland ended, lasted until April 15. The Pegasus force consisted of the Army 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) plus the 1st Marine Regiment. Setting out from Ca Lu, 10 miles east of Khe Sanh, Pegasus opened the highway, linked up with the Marines at Khe Sanh, and engaged NVA in the surrounding area. Operation Pegasus casualties included 59 U.S. Army and 51 Marine Corps dead. They too were left out of the official Khe Sanh casualty count.
On April 15, Operation Pegasus ended and Operation Scotland II began. The Marines at Khe Sanh Combat Base broke out of their perimeter and began attacking the North Vietnamese in the surrounding area. The Army's 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), with more than 400 helicopters under its control, conducted airmobile operations deeper into enemy-controlled areas. The fighting was heavy. An additional 413 Marines were killed during Scotland II as of the end of June 1968. Operation Scotland II continued until the end of the year, resulting in the deaths of 72 more Marines. None of the deaths associated with Scotland II are included in the official count. Historian Ronald Spector, in the book After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam, noted that American casualties in the 10 weeks after the start of Operation Pegasus were more than twice those officially reported during the siege.
The deaths of U.S. Air Force personnel, estimated between five and 20, are also omitted. The official figure of 205 KIA only represents Marine deaths in the Operation Scotland TAOR—that is, Marines killed in proximity to the Khe Sanh Combat Base during the period from November 1, 1967, to March 31, 1968. Scotland was a 26th Marine Regiment operation, so only the deaths of Marines assigned to the regiment, and attached supporting units, were counted. This time period does not particularly coincide with the fighting; rather, it dates from before the siege began and terminates before the siege (and the fighting) ended. The distinctions between Operations Scotland, Pegasus and Scotland II, while important from the command perspective, were not necessarily apparent to individual Marines. For them, the battle started when the North Vietnamese attacks began in January. Fighting around Khe Sanh was continuous. For example, I served with a Marine heavy mortar battery at Khe Sanh during the siege. But only by checking my service record while writing this article did it become evident that I had participated in all three operations.
Upon closer analysis, the official figure does not accurately portray even what it purports to represent. According to Ray Stubbe, a U.S. Navy chaplain during the siege and since then the most significant Khe Sanh historian, the 205 figure is taken only from the records of the 26th Marine Regiment. Stubbe examined the command chronologies of the 1st and 2nd battalions, 26th Marines, plus the after-action reports of the 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines; 1st Battalion, 9th Marines; 1st Battalion, 13th Marines; and more than one dozen other units, all present at Khe Sanh under 26th Marine operational control. These combined sources report a total of 354 KIA. Unlike the official figures, Stubbe's database of Khe Sanh casualties includes verifiable names and dates of death.
On June 19, 1968, another operation began at Khe Sanh, Operation Charlie, the final evacuation and destruction of the Khe Sanh Combat Base. The Marines withdrew all salvageable material and destroyed everything else. The NVA continued shelling the base, and on July 1 launched a company-sized infantry attack against its perimeter. Two Marines died. NVA casualties were more than 200. The base was officially closed on July 5. Marines stayed in the area, conducting operations to recover the bodies of Marines killed previously. On July 10, Pfc Robert Hernandez of Company A, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, was manning an M-60 machine gun position when it took a direct hit from NVA mortars. Hernandez was killed. Ten more Marines and 89 NVA died during this period. They were not included in the official Khe Sanh counts.
On July 11, the Marines finally left Khe Sanh. This is the battle's end date from the North Vietnamese perspective. The NVA 304th Division's history notes that on "9 July 1968, the liberation flag was waving from the flag pole at Ta Con [Khe Sanh] airfield." On July 13, 1968, Ho Chi Minh sent a message to the soldiers of the Route 9–Khe Sanh Front affirming "our victory at Khe Sanh."
The Khe Sanh battlefield was considerably more extensive from the North Vietnamese perspective than from that of the U.S. Marine Corps, both geographically and chronologically. The NVA's main command post was located in Laos, at Sar Lit. Battlefield boundaries extended from eastern Laos eastward along both sides of Route 9 in Quang Tri province, Vietnam, to the coast. Taking a larger but more realistic view, the Khe Sanh campaign resulted in a death toll of American military personnel that approached 1,000.
The official, public estimate of 10,000 to 15,000 North Vietnamese KIA stands in contrast to another estimate made by the American military. On April 5, 1968, MACV prepared an "Analysis of the Khe Sanh Battle" for General Westmoreland. The report, originally classified as secret, noted that intelligence from many sources indicated conclusively that the North Vietnamese had planned a massive ground attack against the base. The attack was to have been supported by armor and artillery. Due to severe losses, however, the NVA abandoned its plan for a massive ground attack. The losses—indicating that the enemy suffered a major defeat—were estimated at 3,550 KIA inflicted by delivered fires (i.e., aerial and artillery bombardment) and 2,000 KIA from ground action, for a total of 5,550 estimated North Vietnamese killed in action as of March 31.
Ray Stubbe has published a translation of the North Vietnamese history of the siege at Khe Sanh. According to this history, originally classified as secret, the battle deaths for all major NVA units participating in the entire Highway 9–
Khe Sanh Front from January 20 until July 20, 1968, totaled 2,469.
Ho Chi Minh's oft-quoted admonition to the French applied equally to the Americans: "You can kill ten of my men for every one I kill of yours, but even at those odds, you will lose and I will win." The calculation by Stubbe that approximately 1,000 Americans died on the Khe Sanh battlefield is especially compelling, given that Stubbe's numbers are accompanied by names and dates of death. Since the official duration of the battle ends even earlier than the termination of the siege itself, a wider definition of the Khe Sanh battlefield to include Operations Scotland, Pegasus and Scotland II also seems reasonable. The official statistics yield a KIA ratio of between 50:1 and 75:1 of North Vietnamese to U.S. military deaths. The figures of 5,500 NVA dead and 1,000 U.S. dead yield a ratio of 5.5:1.
It is difficult to support the claim of an overwhelming American victory at Khe Sanh based solely on the ratios derived from the official casualty count. In fact, neither side won a resounding victory. The NVA surrounded Khe Sanh in an attempt to force the Marines to break out of their fighting positions, which would make it easier to engage and destroy them. If that failed, and it did, they hoped to attack American reinforcements along Route 9 between Khe Sanh and Laos. Operation Pegasus forces, however, were highly mobile and did not attack en masse down Route 9 far enough west of Khe Sanh for the NVA, by then dispersed, to implement their plan.
The Marines knew that their withdrawal from Khe Sanh would present a propaganda victory for Hanoi. On June 28, a Communist spokesman claimed the Americans had been forced to retreat and that Khe Sanh was the "gravest tactical and strategic defeat" for the U.S. in the war. It was the only time Americans abandoned a major combat base because of enemy pressure.
Strategically, however, the withdrawal meant little. The new anchor base was established at Ca Lu, a few miles down Route 9 to the east. Mobile combat operations continued against the North Vietnamese. U.S. reconnaissance forces continued to monitor the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The Marines and their allies at Khe Sanh engaged tens of thousands, and killed thousands, of NVA over a period of many weeks. Indeed, had enemy forces not been at Khe Sanh, they could have joined the NVA and VC who occupied Hue, a much more important strategic target. The Marines fought long, hard and well at Khe Sanh, but they sacrificed in much greater numbers than has been acknowledged by official sources.
Marine Khe Sanh veteran Peter Brush is Vietnam Magazine's book review editor. For additional reading, see: Valley of Decision: The Siege of Khe Sanh, by John Prados and Ray W. Stubbe; and the official Marine Corps history, The Battle for Khe Sanh, by Moyers S. Shore II.
This article was written by Peter Brush and originally published in the June 2007 issue of Vietnam Magazine. For more great articles, subscribe to Vietnam magazine today!
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Last I saw dDavenport is when we pulled out of Khe Sanh. I remember him well! We was a good Marine but I also remember him he was very sick with sometime. I spoke with Capt. O Conner and said we should get him out of here! You know any others from the comm. Section?? Sorry you got wounded taking my place at LZ Sharon. I went back in the field as your replacement never to return back to C 1/13 until two days before I went back. Glenn Prentice gprentice@sbcglobal.net
B. Co. 3rd. Recon 3rd. Marine Div.
Regards, Joe McCabe, Largo, Florida
served with all I can remember is that I was a marine in a rock quarry outside of the fire base. No names only hard times and
one lingering thought we stood our ground. A special thank you
to the US Army I saw only one small army unit in 6months.
Thank you to that special group of men who fired the 106 recoiless that help
save our bacon during an early morning fire fight in early February
God Bless you all
Marine Sgt Don Severson
Khe Sanh, as a scout in late Nov/Dec '67 we reported a large NVA build up with numbers and units over 10k. From personel experience it is a Hell of alot easier to bring support before you are engaged and under fire. I've long held that the powers from Gen. Westmoreland to LBJ administration in order to ralley the American People to support the War knew what was in the wind for Us. Marine Larry Price observed Time, Mag in his comments. They could get the press in, why not more Marines and supplies?
There is one memory that I believe speaks for all of Us that where at Kha Sanh and all the wars we have fought. It was written on a K-ration box up near the HQ
"There is a Love of Freedom for whose who fight and die, that the sheltered will Never know." When the demons come I try to remember those words.
Semper Fi My Brothers
HILL 861 MICHAEL BEAUGUARD OUR CAVE
all of the men and women that served then, now and in the past.
God bless the United States of America
He is now living in Debary FL.(in Volusia County) Please contact me at my email address (his brother) at Whiskey438@aol.com.
He is lklooking forward to hearing from any of you out there especially Earl Coyne.
I am a old AF ACFT mechanic that worked on 01's and 02's. I was stationed out with the Army at DI AN almost the whole year of 1969.. We were FAC guys.
Please feel free to contact me if you remember Mike or have some pics to share with me.
My email is spoonmore233@att.net
Thanks….
Roger D Spoonmore
I hope my fellow Marines are doing ok, I have had many problems since I returned in 1969. Semper Fi
Contact me at taylorndncar@aol.com—my name is joe r. taylor.
James O.Finnegan,M.D.(former C.O.,C-Med,KheSanh
I was nearing the end of high school in 1972 and was expecting like the thousands before me..to get drafted and get sent to Nam, Pres. Nixon had just gotten elected and had other intentions and I was spared. I did serve proudly for 8yrs and was not called to fight in any wars but was willing too if called.To all those who served at Khe Sahn, from one vet to another, I honor your service and sacrifice. God Bless you all and your families.
Was the Small Army SF unit attacked by NVA
This would have been just before the Sea Bees came to snap landing mats together.
Simper Fi
I was part of the Hill fights …. w/ USMC 1/9 …..got hit 3 times on April 26th 1967…shot twice / hit by a hand grenade / hit by a 81 mm mortar …. was dragged down that hill by America's finest hero's ….. recieved "last rites" next morning @ 5am …went to USS Sanctuary….where they put me together & saved my life.
Today I have same wife ( 42 yrs) & 2 great kids … how blessed am i to have survived and I live on the shoulders of those fine men who dragged me down that hill at the risk of losing their own lives. I thank my God / my fellow Marines; and my M-60. If i ever return ; i am bringing it with me.. !
The only "Dog-face" patches I witnessed were the "Screaming Eagles". You seem to want to overcompensate your participation: This page is meant to account and correspond figures of dead heroes and heroic survivors of the seventy-seven days of siege at Khe Sanh. You descecrate our mourning of friends and close kin with your "heroic" self-tribute. Please, leave us in peace and find your own webpage. Thank you!!!
One reason the Pegasus forces were so large is that in addition to opening Route 9, Westmoreland wanted Pegasus to continue into Laos and cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail. This was Westmoreland's plan well into Pegasus. When it became clear permssion was not going to be granted, Pegasus plans were changed. That's why suddently, beginning on April 11, the 1st ACD began leaving the Khe Sanh TAOR for the A Shau Valley. Pegasus ended April 15. It began on April 1, and enemy contact only began in earnest on April 4. There were only about 11 days of fighting in Pegasus. The siege of Khe Sanh lasted 11 weeks. Big difference.
Operation Pegasus was conducted by the 1st Air Cavalry Division. See Tolson's report. Two Marine battalions moved west along Route 9 in the operation, but three brigades of air cavalry troopers, helicopters, artillery, etc. did the leap-frogging to clear the area of the NVA, to clear Route 9, and to breake the siege. My point has always been to highlight the gigantic air assault conducted by an entire division. I don't know how you claim 10,000 Marines were involved in Operation Pegasus unless you are counting the guys at Khe Sanh who were actually under the siege and could not effectively leave the perimeter. I have never said that the Cav should get any cretdit for the battle at Khe Sanh between the Marines and the NVA. You are right–the Cav was not in that. As to your point that most of the NVA left before Pegasus started. I don't know how many NVA were in the area, and YOU don't know, and obviously all the brass did not know–otherwise the Marines would have been going up and down Route 9 to the Rock Pile or to Lang Vei. Regarding your observation about why Pegasus was so large–it was large to do its three-fold mission–kill the NVA, end the siege, clear Route 9. And olson planned to go to the a Shau Valley–which we did. Regarding the contact with the enemy. There is a line in the Patton movie where George C. Scott says–You don't win the war by dieying for your country–you win by making the other dumb son of a bitch die for his country. The Cav had the capabilitry of aerial observation and fire support with its helicopters. It wasn't as easy for the NVA to ambush us as it was for them to ambush Marines–some like the Jacques patrol right outside the wire. I know that NVA were there when we got there and we were able to clear Route 9 and get the engineers back on the bridges. Pegasus may have technically operationaly ended on April 15, and the Cav went to the a Shau Valley, but Marines and NVA still had contact afterwards. So I guess they all didn't go–just enough left to allow the Cav to come in. Maybe they left because it WAS the Cav coming in. My major point is that the Air Cavalry was an effective concept and due to stupid Army politics, it was transferred to the 101st who have screwed up the concept. So there is no misunderstanding–I am not taking anything away from the guys who put up with the hell of Khe Sanh.
Reason I “claim” there were 10,000 Marines in Operation Pegasus is because there were. The battalions were 1/26, 2/26, 3/26, 1/9, 1/13, 1/1, 2/1, 2/3, and 1/11. You may feel the Marines from the 26th Marines should not be included, but they were. By that I mean the operation is listed in our service records.
I don’t know *personally” how many NVA were in the Khe Sanh TAOR. I do know that NVA POWs state that the 325C division had left, except for the 8th Bn, 29th Regiment, and 2nd Bn, 101D Regiment. The 304th division had also left, except for small groups to harass outposts and reinforcements. See MAVC Command History, 1968, Vol. I, pp. 158-159. US intelligence sources also claim most NVA had left by the end of March.
There is lots of detail on the number and disposition of NVA in “B5-T8 in 48 QXD : the Secret Official History of the North Vietnamese Army of the Siege at Khe Sanh, Vietnam, Spring, 1968,” published by the Khe Sanh Veterans, Inc. It is a classified NVA history of the 325th and 304th Divisions. It includes their version of Operation Pegasus, and the role of the 1st ACD in it. It’s available on Amazon.com.
The Marines didn’t “go up and down Route 9” for various reasons, including the fact that dozens of bridges and culverts had to be repaired/replaced before the road could handle heavy traffic. This was in addition to clearing NVA ambush sites on both the north and south of Route 9. Most of the bridges and culverts had been destroyed by the weather, not the NVA. Keep in mind the road was closed to vehicle traffic long before the NVA came into Khe Sanh in large numbers.
Another reason was lack of transport for the Marines at Khe Sanh, most of which had been damaged and destroyed by NVA incoming during the siege. For example in my unit, a heavy mortar battery, 17 of 21 vehicles were rendered not usable during the fighting.
Obviously the NVA were there when you got there. In fact, NVA stayed in the area until around October, 1969. Ray Stubbe has published a book titled “Battalion of Kings” that lists all the Americans killed in the Khe Sanh area, start to end. It contains names, dates and details on the deaths of all US, including the 1st ACD soldiers killed in Operation Pegasus.
Another reason I know the NVA had mostly left by the end of March is because I got to Khe Sanh on December 17, 1967, before the fighting started. I left on April 16, 1968 after the end of Pegasus. It was obvious by the end of March most of the NVA had left. You could tell by our greatly diminished casualty rates, and the reduction in the amount of incoming. I can tell you we felt the battle was over before the Army came to the base.
Obviously the Army and Marines disagree on the role of Operation Pegasus. That makes sense: the Army and Marines disagreed on most everything in Vietnam.
I’ve written a lot about Khe Sanh, including this article. Check out my website if you are interested (Google my name and Khe Sanh). You might enjoy reading my article "Uncommon Ground: Interservice Rivalry in I Corps" from Vietnam magazine, October, 1999, pp. 22-28, about how in addition to fighting the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army, the U.S. Marine Corps also had a fight on its hands with the U.S. Army and Air Force.
Regarding how many NVA were around Khe Sanh when you got there, in 1969 the Marine Corps published their official history of the battle (Captain Moyers S. Shore, The Battle for Khe Sanh). It's available online. It notes that by mid-March there was an exodus of major NVA units from the Khe Sanh TAOR, but they did retain enough troops to "maintain pressure and thus shelling and probes continued" (126). That's why the threat from the NVA mostly seemed over before you guys got there: there is a huge difference between the end of January, when 20,000-40,000 NVA posed a real threat of overrunning the base, and early April, when most of them were dead or gone.
Of course you are correct to note the 1st ACD had unique capabilities. You had something like 440 helicopters, probably more than the Marines had in Vietnam. But that's not to say the relief of the base and end of the siege could not have been accomplished without the 1st ACD.
We clearly differ on the significance of the role of the 1st ACD. You say only the 1st ACD could have relieved Khe Sanh and ended the siege. I can't prove that something that did not happen could have happened, but it's easy for me to imagine that the Marines and ARVN Airborne in Pegasus could have accomplished the same task, even if not as quickly. This is especially easy for me to imagine because there were more Marines and ARVNs in Pegasus than there were NVA around Khe Sanh, not to mention we had almost unlimited air power and the NVA had none.
I'm glad the 1st ACD, the Marines, and the ARVN in Pegasus opened Route 9 from Ca Lu to Khe Sanh. Because of that, I got to leave Khe Sanh when I did (April 16). I was glad to leave, as Khe Sanh was a very grim place.
Lastly, you mention the base being supplied by LAPES. There was more to it than that. See my article "The 109th Quartermaster Company (Air Delivery) and the Defense of Khe Sanh" which is available online. An edited version of the article was published as "The Joint Effort that Broke the Khe Sanh Siege," in Army magazine in April 1997.
How's that?
The 1 ACD AAR on Opn PEGASUS (Tab D, Losses) shows 59 ACD KIA. The Provisional Corps Vietnam AAR on Opn PEGASUS shows 41 USA KIA. Stubbe's Battalion of Kings lists 45 Cav KIA by name. I may have missed a few that did not have Cav unit designations that I recognize as Cav.
The 26th Marine AAR for Opn PEGASUS lists 43 Marines KIA. Stubbe's Battalion of Kings lists 50 KIA in the 26th Marines for Opn PEGASUS
This shows that 26th Marines KIA and 1 ACD KIA were about the same. That's in an operation you can't even admit the 26th Marines participated in.
"I was anxious to get the 26th Marine Regiment out of their static defense position as soon as feasible; so, on D+3, I ordered Colonel Lownds to make a battalion-size attack south from Khe Sanh to seize Hill 471, a strategic piece of terrain affording a commanding view of the base. Following a heavy artillery preparation, the Marines successfully seized the hill killing thirty of the enemy. On the same day, the 2d Brigade of the Cavalry Division assaulted one battalion into an old French fort south of Khe Sanh. Initial contact resulted in four enemy killed. The remaining uncommitted brigade was moved into marshalling areas." Please stop misrepresenting that I have not given credit to the Marines in Operation Pegasus. I wish you'd give the air cavalry credit for ending the siege–most other reasonable people do.
Yet you can't bring yourself to admit the 26th Marines were even participants in Operation Pegasus. Whether they were or not is not a matter of opinion, yours or mine. It's a matter of fact, a fact confirmed by the commander of the 1st ACD, General Tolson.
60 soldiers died in Operation Pegasus, mostly troopers from the 1st ACD but also including a few Special Forces soldiers from FOB-3. 105 Marines died in Operation Pegasus, including Marines from the 26th Marine regiment, their corpsmen, Marines from other units in Pegasus, and a few Marine pilots who died supporting Pegasus. The names of these soldiers and Marines, plus dates and circumstances of their deaths, are listed in the book I mentioned, Battalion of Kings.
You talk about acknowledging sacrifice in Pegasus, yet are so full of self-pride you cannot even admit much less give credit to the Marines who died in Pegasus. No doubt their deaths saved the lives of Cav troopers.
Planning for Pegasus began in late January. At a Pegasus planning session in March in Da Nang of senior Army and Marine commanders Westmoreland ordered contingency plans made for brigade size cross-border operations in Laos after Route 9 was opened. As noted in Prados and Stubbe's history of the battle (Valley of Decision), "Thus, as of March 10, MACV explicitly intended to be prepared for a coup de main thrust into Laos in conjunction with the relief of Khe Sanh (p. 418-419)."
Final Pegasus plans were firmed up at a March 28 meeting. Westmoreland noted it would take two weeks to get permission for the thrust into Laos from Ambassador Sullivan and Washington, DC.
On March 30, Westmoreland was briefed in Saigon on plans for Operation El Paso City, his long held plans for a major advance into Laos.
On April 10, General Tolson, "without warning," received orders from Westmoreland to prepare for an immediate assault into the A Shau Valley. That's because Westmoreland was unable to get permission to invade Laos.
"The basic concept of Operation PEGASUS was as follows: The 1st Marine Regiment with two battalions would launch a ground attack west toward Khe Sanh while the 3d Brigade would lead the 1st Cavalry air assault. On D+1 and D+2 all elements would continue to attack west toward Khe Sanh; and, on the following day, the 2d Brigade of the Cavalry would land three battalions southeast of Khe Sanh and attack northwest. The 26th Marine Regiment, which was holding Khe Sanh, would attack south to secure Hill 471. On D+4, the 1st Brigade would air assault just south of Khe Sanh and attack north. The following day the 3d Army of the Republic of Vietnam Airborne Task Force would air assault southwest of Khe Sanh and attack toward Lang Vei Special Forces Camp. Linkup was planned at the end of seven days." This is the second time I've acknowledged the role of the 26th Marine Regiment. They ultimately did take Hill 471 in a bloody fight. I've told you several times that I am not taking anything away from the actions of the Marines. I just want to insure that the greatest "air cavalry" operation in the history of the United States military is properly acknowledged. I've read some of your writings and you seem to go out of your way to minimize the role of Operation Pegasus in the relief of the siege of Khe Sanh. Perhaps some fellow Marines may like this approach and maybe even some magazines may like it, but I know better. Opertion Pegasus was devised to send in the 1st Air Cavalry Division augmented by Marines and ARVNs to perform a three-fold mission (1) clear route 9, (2) kill NVA, and (3) end the siege. It did all three in one week. Yes, you are correct about my being very proud to have been a part of that opertion, but you are wrong that I have not given credit to the Marines involved. And please don't play that game with me about not honoring those who died. I understand all that stuff–been there, done that.
Joe
Pegasus lasted two weeks, and casualties were light, less than anticipated. Given the long history of Americans and Marines at Khe Sanh, Pegasus doesn't seem all that important. Sorry, but that's how it seems to me.
One thing in my opinion that *is* under emphasized is the role of the Army at FOB-3 at Khe Sanh. They were in the area before, during, and after the time when the Marines were there.
Pegasus is significant to you and to me, because we were participants. But beyond that, what was the significance of Pegasus? In other words, what is the significance of ending the siege? It meant Route 9 was now open.
When did the siege begin? Let's pick January 21 1968, when the NVA attacks begain in earnest. What was the situation before that? Route 9 was closed, and had been closed since September 1967. In fact, Route 9 was closed from September 1964 until March 1967. It was open from March-September 1967, then closed until Pegasus opened it in April 1968.
My point here is that it was normal for Route 9 to be closed.
The NVA began leaving before Pegasus began. Most left, some stayed. Pegasus opened Route 9 on April 8 1968. Heavy traffic could now get to Khe Sanh via land route. Supplies poured into to support 1 ACD and Marine operations. A week later 1 ACD left.
Now Khe Sanh could be supplied by overland convoy. That meant the NVA could attack the convoys. That's what they did. For example, on May 19 they launched a large attack on a Marine road sweep operation. 37 Marines and 300 NVA were killed. That month, 149 Marines and 19 soldiers died around Khe Sanh.
Because the road was open, it was easier to dismantle the base. The base was dismantled. Fighting continued. The NVA kept shelling the base.
A year later the situation was the same. The NVA were back and the Marines were fighting them. Have you read Karl Marlantes' book Matterhorn? It's about the Marines fighting the NVA in this area in early 1969, same as Marines were fighting the NVA in the same area two years earlier, and one year earlier.
So overall, what was the significance of Pegasus? Keep in mind that the siege wasn't really a siege in the literal sense of the word. Supplies were delivered. Killed and wounded were evacuated. Marines arrived for duty, and went home if their tours were up. Marines went to and from R&R during the siege.
Operationally, what difference did it make?
Peter Brush